Excesso de confiança e honorários de auditoria: o conselho fiscal exerce influência nessa relação?

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21680/2176-9036.2022v14n2ID24241

Palavras-chave:

Contabilidade Comportamental, Tomada de Decisão, CEO, Risco Material

Resumo

Objetivo: Esse estudo tem como objetivo investigar o papel do conselho fiscal enquanto mecanismo capaz de alterar a capacidade do gestor de influenciar os custos de auditoria.

Metodologia: Foram analisadas 231 observações de empresas abertas que negociaram suas ações na [B]³ no ano de 2017. Para investigar a relação objeto desse estudo, realizou-se análise por meio de regressão linear múltipla com estimador MQO.

Resultados: Na amostra analisada, foi identificado que o excesso de confiança dos gestores aumenta os custos de auditoria, sendo consistente com o argumento de que o excesso de confiança dos gestores pode elevar o risco de erro material. Contudo, possivelmente em função de características do ambiente emergente ou diferentes níveis de eficiência do conselho fiscal, não foi possível confirmar a hipótese de que o conselho fiscal exerce influência significativa na relação entre o excesso de confiança do gestor e os custos de auditoria.

Contribuições do Estudo: No campo empírico, essa pesquisa fornece subsídios para investidores e reguladores no tocante a atuação dos mecanismos de governança - mais especificamente o conselho fiscal - na relação entre o auditor e o cliente. Sob a perspectiva teórica, acrescenta-se a literatura contábil ao preencher lacuna existente acerca das consequências dos vieses comportamentais dos gestores no custo de auditoria sob a moderação do conselho fiscal.

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Biografia do Autor

Jorge Luiz De Santana Júnior, Universidade de São Paulo (USP)

Doutorando em Contabilidade na Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Mestre em Contabilidade pela Universidade Federal da Bahia (2020) e Graduado em Ciências Contábeis pela Universidade Federal de Sergipe (2017).

Thiago Rios Sena, Faculdade Lusofona da Bahia

Mestre em Contabilidade (2020) pela Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA). Especialista em Metodologia do Ensino em Contabilidade (2018) pela UnyLeya. Bacharel em Ciências Contábeis (2017) pela Universidade do Estado da Bahia (UNEB). Atua como Professor na Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia, Centro Universitário Estácio e Faculdade Lusófona da Bahia.

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Publicado

04-07-2022

Como Citar

JÚNIOR, J. L. D. S.; SENA, T. R. Excesso de confiança e honorários de auditoria: o conselho fiscal exerce influência nessa relação?. REVISTA AMBIENTE CONTÁBIL - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte - ISSN 2176-9036, [S. l.], v. 14, n. 2, p. 38–57, 2022. DOI: 10.21680/2176-9036.2022v14n2ID24241. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/ambiente/article/view/24241. Acesso em: 10 dez. 2022.

Edição

Seção

Seção 1: Contabilidade Aplicada ao Setor Empresarial (S1)