Exceso de confianza y honorarios de auditoría: ¿influye el consejo fiscal en esta relación?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21680/2176-9036.2022v14n2ID24241Palabras clave:
Contabilidad del comportamiento, Toma de decisiones, CEO, Riesgo materialResumen
Objetivo: Este estudio tiene como objetivo investigar el papel del consejo fiscal como un mecanismo capaz de cambiar la capacidad del administrador para influir en los costos de auditoría.
Metodología: se analizaron 231 observaciones de empresas públicas que cotizaron sus acciones en [B] ³ en 2017. Para investigar la relación objeto de este estudio se realizó un análisis mediante regresión lineal múltiple con un estimador MCO.
Resultados: En la muestra analizada, se identificó que el exceso de confianza de los gerentes aumenta los costos de auditoría, lo cual es consistente con el argumento de que el exceso de confianza de los gerentes puede incrementar el riesgo de error material. Sin embargo, posiblemente por las características del entorno emergente o los diferentes niveles de eficiencia del consejo fiscal, no fue posible confirmar la hipótesis de que el consejo fiscal ejerce una influencia significativa en la relación entre el exceso de confianza de los administradores y los costos de auditoría.
Contribuciones del Estudio: En el campo empírico, esta investigación otorga subsidios a inversionistas y reguladores sobre el rol de los mecanismos de gobernanza - más específicamente el consejo fiscal - en la relación entre el auditor y el cliente. Desde una perspectiva teórica, la literatura contable se agrega para llenar el vacío existente sobre las consecuencias de los sesgos de comportamiento de los gerentes sobre el costo de auditoría bajo la moderación del consejo de supervisión.
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