Enativismo radical: exposição, desafios e perspectivas [Radical enactivism: exposition, challenges and prospects]

Autores

  • Giovanni Rolla Doutorando na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2018v25n46ID12129

Palavras-chave:

Ação, Percepção, Cognição, Representação, Racionalidade, Mente Corporificada [Action, Perception, Cognition, Representation, Rationality, Embodied Mind]

Resumo

Primeiro, o enativismo é apresentado como a ideia de que a ação é constitutiva da cognição e é situado historicamente a partir da psicologia ecológica de Gibson.  O enativismo radical (segundo o qual nem toda cognição é representacional) é então diferenciado de enativismo moderado (segundo o qual a cognição envolve representações orientadas-pela-ação). É feita uma defesa do enativismo radical diante da objeção de que o papel da ação na cognição é meramente causal. São avançados dois desafios para o futuro do enativismo radical: como podem emergir estados representacionais e qual é a concepção de racionalidade apropriada para este quadro teórico.

 

[Enactivism is first presented as the view that action is constitutive of cognition and it is historically situated as arising from Gibson’s ecological psychology. Radical enactivism (according to which not all cognition is representational) is then differentiated from moderate enactivism (according to which cognition involves action-oriented representations). An argument for choosing the former is then presented. Radical enactivism is defended from the objection that the role played by action in cognition is merely causal. Two challenges for the future of radical enactivism are advanced: how can representational states emerge and which conception of rationality fits this theoretical framework.]

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Publicado

29-01-2018

Como Citar

ROLLA, G. Enativismo radical: exposição, desafios e perspectivas [Radical enactivism: exposition, challenges and prospects]. Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN), [S. l.], v. 25, n. 46, p. 29–57, 2018. DOI: 10.21680/1983-2109.2018v25n46ID12129. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/12129. Acesso em: 6 dez. 2024.