Conhecimento procedimental e gettierização
Keywords:
Conhecimento procedimental, Conhecimento proposicional, Gettierização.Abstract
Defendo que o conhecimento procedimental não é susceptível de sofrer gettierização, uma vez que não está inserido no conjunto de objetos epistémicos que se dispõem a ser afetados por contra-exemplos tipo-Gettier.Downloads
References
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