Uma defesa do Argumento da Terra gêmea Moral contra o Realismo Moral Naturalista
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n63ID33022Keywords:
Realismo Moral Naturalista, Argumento da Terra Gêmea Moral, Metaética, Semântica MoralAbstract
O Argumento da Terra Gêmea Moral (ATGM) é o desafio semântico central para o Realismo Moral Naturalista (RMN). À fim de evitar tal problema, os defensores do RMN têm articulado uma série de réplicas ao ATGM. Neste artigo, abordo algumas dessas réplicas e defendo a tese de que elas não refutam o ATGM. Considero duas propostas em específico: o Argumento da Tradução, de D. Copp, e o Argumento do Fim da Investigação Moral, de A. Viggiano. Apresento essas objeções, mostro em que sentido pretendem responder ao ATGM e argumento que cada uma delas é vulnerável a vários problemas. Concluo que os ataques de Copp e Viggiano ao ATGM devem ser recusados e que o desafio semântico ao RMN persiste.
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