LOBBYING OF THE GLENIF IN THE IASB THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF ACTION COLLECTIVE OF OLSON
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21680/2176-9036.2017v9n1ID9483Abstract
In 1965, Mancur Olson developed the Theory of Collective Action from the study of rational individuals who form a group with interest in obtaining collective benefits. Later, Lindahl (1987) exposes the Olson's theory based on three categories: (1) the lobbying will not occur unless selective incentives are introduced to motivate individuals to contribute; (2) costs (including organization and monitoring) are smaller in small groups; and (3) the identification of real benefit shared by the largest member of the group. With the appearance of groups with primary interest in influencing the creation and issues of accounting standards issued by the IASB, comes the GLENIF in 2011, with 17 countries the Latin American, with joint efforts and common goals between these countries. With the low representation in research that deal with interest groups with regulators and accounting standard-setting members, this study aims to show the level of theoretical line, from the categories of collective action of Mancur Olson, with the establishment and performance of GLENIF in IASB. For this it evaluates two premises based on the categories of the Theory Collective Action of Olson’s: (1) the receipt of selective incentives by member countries of GLENIF, from a questionnaire sent by the group at a conference held in Mexico; (2) identify if GLENIF represents the interests of its greatest beneficiary: the Brazil, analyzing the six issues outlined in the Revised Exposure Draft regarding the revenue recognition standard issued by the IASB/FASB. Analyze the letters sent by the comments GLENIF and CPC (representing the individual position of Brazil) to identify the existence of positioning of convergence between them and the level of success before the Boards. The results indicate that the letter sent by the CPC does not fully represent the position of Brazil on the interest group (GLENIF) and the level of theoretical alignment of the group is in accordance with two categories of Mancur Olson's theory.
Keywords: Lobbying. Comments letters. GLENIF. IFRS. IASB;
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