La relación entre la remuneración de ejecutivos y los gastos en investigación y desarrollo: un análisis de empresas de mediana y alta tecnología que cotizan en la bolsa de valores brasileña

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21680/2176-9036.2026v18n2ID44510

Palabras clave:

Compensación Ejecutiva, Investigación y Desarrollo, B3 e Innovación.

Resumen

Objetivo: Este estudio analiza la relación entre la remuneración ejecutiva (fija y variable) y el gasto en investigación y desarrollo (I+D), utilizado como indicador del esfuerzo innovador, en empresas que cotizan en la bolsa brasileña. El estudio examina cómo la estructura de incentivos mitiga la aversión al riesgo gerencial en sectores donde la innovación es estratégica. La investigación orienta el análisis de la relación entre la remuneración ejecutiva y la intensidad de las inversiones en I+D en empresas brasileñas de tecnología media-alta y alta.

Metodología: Esta investigación utiliza un enfoque cuantitativo, descriptivo y documental, analizando datos de 53 empresas brasileñas que cotizan en bolsa entre 2010 y 2022. El enfoque se centra en empresas con niveles de desarrollo tecnológico medio-alto y alto, según la clasificación de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE), adaptada por la Encuesta de Innovación Industrial (PINTEC/IBGE). Los datos se analizaron mediante regresión lineal con datos de panel, controlando variables como tamaño, endeudamiento, rentabilidad y COVID-19.

Resultados: Los resultados demuestran que la estructura de compensación influye en la disposición de los directivos a asignar recursos a la innovación. Los hallazgos indican que, si bien existe una correlación positiva entre los incentivos variables de compensación ejecutiva y la I+D, esta relación se ve moderada por la aversión al riesgo y las características sectoriales. Esto sugiere que la compensación variable actúa como un mecanismo parcial para mitigar el conflicto de agencia, pero su eficacia depende de su equilibrio con los objetivos a corto plazo.

Contribuciones del Estudio: Esta investigación contribuye a la literatura al demostrar cómo funciona la Teoría de la Agencia en un mercado emergente, donde factores como la inestabilidad institucional influyen en las decisiones contables de los gerentes. El estudio muestra que, para las empresas de alta tecnología en Brasil, alinear los intereses mediante la compensación ejecutiva es crucial para sustentar proyectos a largo plazo en lugar de resultados inmediatos.

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Biografía del autor/a

Ana Francyele Parente Borges, Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Estudiante de máster en el Programa de Posgrado en Control de Gestión y Contabilidad (PPGCONT) de la Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), en la ciudad de Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul (RS).

Andressa Germann Avila, Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Estudiante de máster en el Programa de Posgrado en Control de Gestión y Contabilidad (PPGCONT) de la Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), en la ciudad de Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul (RS).

Maria Ivanice Vendruscolo, Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Doctora en Informática Educativa por la Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Profesora del Programa de Posgrado en Control de Gestión y Contabilidad (PPGCONT) de la Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), en la ciudad de Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul (RS).

Fernanda Kreuzberg, Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Doctora en Contabilidad por la Universidad Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC). Profesora del Programa de Posgrado en Control de Gestión y Contabilidad (PPGCONT) de la Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), en la ciudad de Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul (RS).

Fernanda Gomes Victor, Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Doctora en Administración, con especialización en Contabilidad y Finanzas, por la Escuela de Administración de la Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Profesora del Programa de Posgrado en Control de Gestión y Contabilidad (PPGCONT) de la Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), en la ciudad de Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul (RS).

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Publicado

06-07-2026

Cómo citar

Borges, A. F. P., Avila, A. G., Vendruscolo, M. I., Kreuzberg, F., & Victor, F. G. (2026). La relación entre la remuneración de ejecutivos y los gastos en investigación y desarrollo: un análisis de empresas de mediana y alta tecnología que cotizan en la bolsa de valores brasileña. REVISTA AMBIENTE CONTÁBIL - Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande Do Norte, 18(2). https://doi.org/10.21680/2176-9036.2026v18n2ID44510

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Sección 7: Internacional (S7)