Minimalism and the Pragmatic Frame

Autores

  • Ana Falcato Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz/ Universidade Nova de Lisboa (IFILNOVA)

Palavras-chave:

Semantic minimalism, Minimal propositions, Occasionalism, Pragmatic frame, the

Resumo

In the debate between literalism and contextualism in semantics, Kent Bach’s project is often taken to stand on the latter side of the divide. In this paper I argue this is a misleading assumption and justify it by contrasting Bach’s assessment of the theoretical eliminability of minimal propositions arguably expressed by well-formed sentences with standard minimalist views, and by further contrasting his account of the division of interpretative processes ascribable to the semantics and pragmatics of a language with a parallel analysis carried out by the most radical opponent to semantic minimalism, i.e., by occasionalism. If my analysis proves right, the sum of its conclusions amounts to a refusal of Bach’s main dichotomies.

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Biografia do Autor

Ana Falcato, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz/ Universidade Nova de Lisboa (IFILNOVA)

ANA FALCATO (aniusca@hotmail.com) is Humboldt Research Fellow at the University of Mainz (Germany). Her recent publications include Contextualism in Contemporary Philosophy of Language (Colibri, 2013), ‘How far does Wittgenstein go with the Context Principle?’ (Wittgenstein-Studien, 2014) and ‘A counterexample to the originarity of reasons in What we Owe to Each Other’ (Aurora, 2014).

Referências

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BACH, K. Conversational Impliciture. Mind and Language, 9, 1994, p. 124-162.

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BACH, K. The Myth of Conventional Implicature. Linguistics and Philosophy, v. 22, n. 4, 1999[b], p. 327-366.

BACH, K. You don’t say? Synthèse, 128, 2001, p. 15-44.

BACH, K. Context ex-machina. In: SZABÓ, Z. (Ed.). Semantics vs. Pragmatics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. p. 15-44.

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DAVIDSON, D. Truth and Meaning. In: DAVIDSON, D. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 17-40.

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RECANATI, F. Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

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TRAVIS, C. Occasion-Sensitivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

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Publicado

12-02-2016

Como Citar

FALCATO, A. Minimalism and the Pragmatic Frame. Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN), [S. l.], v. 22, n. 39, p. 39–67, 2016. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/7048. Acesso em: 4 jul. 2024.

Edição

v. 22 n. 39 (2015): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN)

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Artigos

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