KANTIANOS SÃO MUITO EMOTIVOS? UMA HIPÓTESE NEUROCIENTÍFICA

Autores

  • Lincoln Frias Universidade Federal de Alfenas

Palavras-chave:

Deontologia, Emoções, Ética, Neurociência, Utilitarismo

Resumo

Na última década várias estudos empíricos sobre a
moralidade foram publicados, utilizando ressonância magnética
funcional, análises de cérebros lesionados e manipulações
ambientais. A principal hipótese dessas pesquisas é que as intuições
e emoções têm um papel crucial nos juízos morais. Porém, elas não
devem ser entendidas como mecanismos frívolos e puramente
irracionais, mas sim como atalhos mentais lapidados pela seleção
natural quando as situações exigem uma resposta rápida. Uma
previsão dessa hipótese é que grande parte de nossas justificativas
morais na verdade são meras racionalizações de avaliações
inconscientes. Tais pesquisas sugeriram o Modelo do Processo
Duplo, segundo o qual os juízos utilitaristas se baseiam nas áreas
cerebrais mais associadas a planejamento e pensamento abstrato
enquanto que os juízos deontológicos estão mais associados a áreas
ativadas durante respostas intuitivas, de maneira que as pessoas
tendem ao utilitarismo quando a carga emocional é baixa e tendem
à deontologia quando o conteúdo emocional da situação é alto
(Greene, 2008). O presente artigo apresenta esse modelo, as
evidências a seu favor e as críticas feitas ele – em especial aquelas
feitas por (Moll, J. & De Oliveira-Souza, R., 2007). Ao final são
discutidas as implicações que a descoberta dos mecanismos
intuitivos da moralidade pode ter para questões de ética prática e
políticas públicas.

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Publicado

14-07-2015

Como Citar

FRIAS, L. KANTIANOS SÃO MUITO EMOTIVOS? UMA HIPÓTESE NEUROCIENTÍFICA. Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN), [S. l.], v. 20, n. 33, p. 195–225, 2015. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/7516. Acesso em: 22 dez. 2024.

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v. 20 n. 33 (2013): Princípios: revista de filosofia

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Artigos

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