Constraint on Pragmatist Interpretations of Being and Time

Abstract

This paper aims at assessing Gethmann’s main objection to Tugendhat’s criticism of Heidegger’s concept of truth. While Tugendhat holds that Heidegger had lost the criteria for the distinction between truth and falsity, Gethmann claims that the truth criteria are to be located in the pragmatic dimension of Dasein’s theoretical modalities. For Gethmann, Heidegger had advanced a shift of the truth-model, from the propositional model of truth towards the operational model of truth, a shift fully neglected by Tugendhat, who overlooked the fact that the novelty in Heidegger is that the most primordial truth is to be understood as a success-category. First I will argue that what Gethmann calls the “operational model of truth” is incompatible with the textual evidence in Being and Time. I will secondly show that Gethmann’s model does not provide the missing truth-criteria. I conclude by indicating pending issues concerning the differences between Tugendhat’s and Gethmann’s Heidegger-interpretations, as well as regarding the assessment of Tugendhat’s criticism of Heidegger’s concept of truth.