On the vulnerability of rigid designation: the kuhnian criticism of the Causal Theory of Reference

Abstract

The application of the Causal Theory of Reference to terms for natural kinds is generally defended on the basis of arguments which presuppose the legitimacy of mental experiments like the famous 'Twin Earth Experiment'. This kind of argument presuppose that: (i) it is possible to distinguish accidental from essential properties of natural kinds and (ii) that there is a world in which distinct natural kinds share all essential properties, but differ in their essential properties. This text aims at defending an interpretation of Thomas Kuhn's criticism of the Causal Theory based on the partial refusal of (i) and (ii) that builds upon Ian Hacking's taxonomic reading of the thesis of incommensurability thesis between scientific theories. Our conclusion is that such a reading allows one to refuse the recurrent claim that the Causal Theory refutes the Kuhnian thesis of incommensurability.