A Lógica da Ciência e o Falibilismo Epistemológico do Logical Syntax de Rudolf Carnap

Abstract

This article aims to analyze an important moment of transformation in the Rudolf Carnap’s work. The moment we are concern about refers to the publication of The Logical Syntax of Language in 1934 and the modifications refers to author’s logical analysis structure and metatheoretical positions. Specifically, in the methodological scope, Carnap develops the logical syntax as the structure of logic-linguistic analysis and elaborates the Logic of Science as the field of Philosophy of Science; in the metatheoretical scope, Carnap substitutes Aufbau’s methodological foundationalism for epistemological fallibilism. In the face of such changes, Coffa, a central reference of carnapian revisionism, claimed that Carnap’s empiricism with the syntactic ascension and the loss of protocol sentences incorrigibility status was led to the empirical basis’ conventionality and epistemological relativism. Therefore, our aim in this article is to present a Logical syntax’s consistent interpretation as well as to evaluate and critically discuss Coffa’s interpretation in The semantic tradition from Kant to Carnap.