Normatividade, experiência e certeza em Wittgenstein

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2022v29n59ID26497

Keywords:

Wittgenstein, Necessity, Experience, Certainty.

Abstract

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein claims that the core issue of Philosophy concerns the very nature of the proposition. Later on, after rejecting this claim, Wittgenstein also reconsiders his view on logical necessity, which was implied by his earlier thoughts. From this revised standpoint, a new account on logical necessity is provided, by means of which it is acknowledged that some propositions gain the status of being necessary on a praxis base. Accordingly, this leads Wittgenstein to give a whole new flavour to the traditional synthetic-analytic distinction. Wittgenstein’s work reconcile the revisable character of logical certainty with the objective nature of the expression of experience, preserving the logical character of certainty in a context where necessity is characterized in terms of the absence of reasons.

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References

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Published

04-08-2022

How to Cite

TELES DE OLIVEIRA, W. Normatividade, experiência e certeza em Wittgenstein. Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN), [S. l.], v. 29, n. 59, p. 111–129, 2022. DOI: 10.21680/1983-2109.2022v29n59ID26497. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/26497. Acesso em: 4 jan. 2025.

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Dossiê 130 anos do artigo de Frege ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’