O Voluntarismo de Van Fraassen: Anarquia Epistêmica ou Irracionalismo Científico

Bruno Malavolta e Silva

doi:10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n63ID29583

Autores/as

Bruno Malavolta e Silva UFRGS

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n63ID29583

Palabras clave:

Posturas Epistêmicas, Relativismo, Van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance, Voluntarismo

Resumen

Em The Empirical Stance, van Fraassen propõe o voluntarismo de posturas epistêmicas: é racional tudo o que é racionalmente permitido, e apenas a incoerência é racionalmente proibida. O voluntarismo de posturas é uma concepção permissiva de racionalidade, que permite a um agente escolher qual postura epistêmica adotar, onde uma postura epistêmica é entendida como um feixe de atitudes avaliativas (e.g. admirar, priorizar) acerca de como formar conhecimento. A vantagem proclamada pelo voluntarismo é a sua capacidade para explicar a racionalidade de revoluções científicas: a aceitação de novos paradigmas não decorre do seguimento de regras metodológicas fixas, mas expressa uma escolha de aderir a um novo sistema de valores e posturas epistêmicas. Defendo que o voluntarismo enfrenta um dilema entre duas situações insatisfatórias: ou assume o conservadorismo epistêmico (i.e. que nossas crenças atuais possuem justificação prima facie) e torna-se incapaz de explicar a racionalidade das revoluções científicas; ou rejeita o conservadorismo epistêmico, e torna-se incapaz de criticar sistemas cognitivos alternativos, por mais absurdos que sejam (desde que coerentes). De um modo ou de outro, o voluntarismo oferece uma epistemologia incompleta para cumprir as finalidades postuladas por van Fraasen.

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O Voluntarismo de Van Fraassen

Anarquia Epistêmica ou Irracionalismo Científico

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