Van Fraassen's Voluntarism
Epistemic Anarchy or Scientific Irrationalism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n63ID29583Keywords:
Posturas Epistêmicas, Relativismo, Van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance, VoluntarismoAbstract
At The Empirical Stance, van Fraassen defends a voluntarism regarding epistemic stances: what is rational is whatever is rationally permitted, and only incoherence is rationally forbidden. Stance voluntarism is a permissive account of rationality, which allows an agent to choose between different epistemic stances, while an epistemic stance is understood as a cluster of evaluative attitudes about how to attain knowledge (e.g. admire, prioritize). The theoretical advantage claimed for stance voluntarism is its capacity to explain the rationality of scientific revolutions: the acceptance of new paradigms is not the result of historically fixed methodological norms, but rather the choice of endorsing a new system of epistemic stances and values. I claim that stance voluntarism faces dilemma between two unsatisfactory claims: either it assumes epistemic conservativism (i.e. that our actual beliefs have prima facie justification) and becomes uncapable of explaining the rationality of scientific revolutions; or it rejects epistemic conservativism, and becomes uncapable of objectively rejecting alternative belief systems, regardless of how absurd they are (as long as they are coherent). Either way, stance voluntarism offers an epistemology which is underdeveloped to fulfill the aims van Fraassen poses for it.
Downloads
References
ALSPECTOR-KELLY, M. "Constructive Empiricism Revisited". Metascience, [s. l.], v. 21, 2012, p. 187–191.
BAUMANN, P. "Empiricism, Stances, and The Problem of Voluntarism". Synthese, [s. l.], v. 178, n. 1, 2011, p. 27–36.
BLACKBURN, S. Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
BOUCHER, S. "Stances and Epistemology". Metaphilosophy, [s. l.], v. 49, n. 4, 2018.
BOZZO, A. P. "On What Empiricism Cannot Be". Metaphilosophy, [s. l.], v. 47, n. 2, 2016.
CHAKRAVARTTY, A. "A Puzzle About Voluntarism About Rational Epistemic Stances". Synthese, [s. l.], v. 178, n. 37, 2011., p. 37–48
CHAKRAVARTTY, A. "Suspension of Belief and Epistemologies of Science". International Journey for the Study of Skepticism, [s. l.], v. 5, 2015, p. 168–192.
CHAKRAVARTTY, A. Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
CHRISTENSEN, D. "Conservatism in Epistemology". Noûs, [s. l.], v. 28, n. 1, 1994, p. 69–89.
DICKEN, P. Constructive Empiricism: Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
ELDER, J. "Defending stance voluntarism". Philosophical Studies, [s. l.], v. 176, n. 11, 2019, p. 3019–3039.
ENGEL, P. "Volitionism and Voluntarism about Belief". In: MEIJERS, A. (Ed.). Belief, Cognition and the Will. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999, p. 9–25.
FINE, A. "The Natural Ontological Attitude". In: LEPLIN, J. (Ed.). Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 83–107.
HARMAN, G. Reasoning, Meaning and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
HO, D. "Farewell to Empiricism". In: MONTON, B. (Ed.). Images of Empiricism. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 319–334.
JAMES, W. "The Will to Believe". The New World, [s. l.], v. 5, 1896, p. 327–347.
JAUERNIG, A. "Must Empiricism Be a Stance, and Could It Be One? How to Be an Empiricist and a Philosopher at the Same Time". In: MONTON, B. (Ed.). Images of Empiricism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 272–318.
LADYMAN, J. "Discussion: Empiricism versus Metaphysics". Philosophical Studies, [s. l.], v. 121, 2004, p. 133–145.
LADYMAN, J. "The Epistemology of Constructive Empiricism". In: MONTON, B. (Ed.). Images of Empiricism. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 46–61.
LIPTON, P. "Epistemic Options". Philosophical Studies, [s. l.], v. 121, 2004, p. 147–158.
MADDY, P. Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
MCCAIN, K. "The virtues of epistemic conservatism". Synthese, [s. l.], v. 164, n. 2, 2008, p. 185–200.
O’SHAUGHNESSY, B. The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
OWENS, D. "Epistemic Akrasia". The Monist, [s. l.], v. 85, 2002, p. 381–397.
PSILLOS, S. "Putting a Bridle on Irrationality: An Appraisal of Van Fraassen’s New Epistemology". In: MONTON, B. (Ed.). Images of Empiricism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 134–164.
ROWBOTTOM, D. P. "Stances and paradigms: a reflection". Synthese, [s. l.], v. 178, n. 1, 2011, p. 111–119.
ROWBOTTOM, D. P.; BUENO, O. "How to change it: modes of engagement, rationality, and stance voluntarism". Synthese, [s. l.], v. 178, n. 1, p. 7–17, 2011.
ROWBOTTOM, D. P. "The Empirical Stance vs. The Critical Attitude". South African Journal of Philosophy, [s. l.], v. 24, n. 3, 2005, p. 200–223.
SCHOENFIELD, M. "Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism is True and What It Tell Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief". Noûs, [s. l.], v. 48, 2014, p. 193–218.
STEUP, M. "Empiricism, metaphysics, and voluntarism". Synthese, [s. l.], v. 178, n. 1, 2011, p. 19–26.
TELLER, P. "What is a Stance". Philosophical Studies, [s. l.], v. 121, 2004, p. 159–171.
TELLER, P. "Learning to live with voluntarism". Synthese, [s. l.], v. 178, n. 1, 2011, p. 49–66.
VAN FRAASSEN, B. C. "Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science". In: CHURCHLAND, P.; HOOKER, C. (Eds.). Images of Science. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985.
VAN FRAASSEN, B. C. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
VAN FRAASSEN, B. C. "The False Hopes of Traditional Epistemology". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, [s. l.], v. 60, 2000, p. 253–80.
VAN FRAASSEN, B. C. "Constructive Empiricism Now". Philosophical Studies, [s. l.], v. 106, 2001, p. 151–170.
VAN FRAASSEN, B. C. The Empirical Stance. New Have & London: Yale University Press, 2002.
VAN FRAASSEN, B. C. "Précis of The Empirical Stance". Philosophical Studies, [s. l.], v. 121, 2004a, p. 127–132.
VAN FRAASSEN, B. C. "Replis to Discussion of The Empirical Stance". Philosophical Issues, [s. l.], v. 121, 2004b, p. 171–192.
VAN FRAASSEN, B. C. "From a View of Science to a New Empiricism". In: MONTON, B. (Ed.). Images of Empiricism. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 337–384.
WILLIAMS, B. "Deciding to Believe". In: Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 136–151.
WYLIE, A. "Arguments for Scientific Realism: the Ascending Spiral". American Philosophical Quarterly, [s. l.], v. 23, 1986, p. 287–297.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2023 Bruno Malavolta e Silva
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
Português (Brasil)
English
Español (España)
Français (Canada)
