A Marca do Cognitivo e Cognição 4E
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2022v29n58ID26562Keywords:
Mente Estendida, Cognição Enativa, Cognição Incorporada, Cognição CorporificadaAbstract
In this article it is defended that the notion known as “The mark of the cognitive” is better characterized as a process that performs the function of generating intelligent behavior, in a flexible and adaptive way, capable of adapting to circumstances, given it is a context sensitive process. For that, some relevant definitions of cognition are examined. In the end, it is pointed out that the definition of the mark of cognition as a context-sensitive process takes into account several factors that were added as constitutive parts of cognitive phenomena over the years, especially the 4E Cognition, which cannot be satisfactorily accommodated alongside the preceding notions of cognition. Accordingly, this article should not be mistaken merely as an exercise in intellectual history, but as a brief and accessible attempt to advance the debate.
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