Divergences in the interpretation of the Fregean conception of Bedeutung

Abstract

The concept of Bedeutung is a central concept in Frege’s philosophy, however there is a huge divergence in the literature about its adequate interpretation. Dummett, Sluga, Carl, Burge, Tugendhat, and others Frege’s commentators will present discordant interpretations of Bedeutung, which are commited to general aspects of Frege’s logical/philosophical perspectives. Based on this, the main goal of this paper is to reconstruct the discussions associated to the interpretation and translation of the Fregean concept of Bedeutung, showing that the tradicional characterization of Bedeutung as reference brings a series of exegetical problems. On the one hand, Bedeutung, understood as reference, implies that sentences must be understood as a special kind of proper name, however, such an interpretation seems to be incompatible with the so-called Fregean contexto principle. On the other hand, revisionista interpretations, in turn, contradict Frege’s supposed realism, besides not being compatible with the presentation found in Über Sinn umd Bedeutung.