THE BADNESS OF DEATH AND THE CHALLENGE OF TIME

Authors

  • André Luiz Lima Cardoso Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n61ID31669

Keywords:

Death, Harm, Comparativism, Challenge of Time

Abstract

In this article, we intend to explore the comparativist thesis about the badness of death and how it deals with the so-called Challenge of Time. According to comparativism, death can be an evil insofar as the person would be better off had he not died. However, if when we die we cease to exist, how can death be something bad? More specifically, at what point does death harm the subject? To answer this question, we will first explain what exactly the comparativist thesis consists of, and how it can argue for some prudential value of death. Next, we will explain what the challenge of time is and, finally, we will analyze the answers provided by the comparativists to the problem. We will thus seek to defend that comparativism can not only say whether a death is bad, but also how bad it can be for the individual and, in addition, that this approach proposes plausible solutions to the challenge of time.

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References

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Published

03-07-2023

How to Cite

LIMA CARDOSO, A. L. THE BADNESS OF DEATH AND THE CHALLENGE OF TIME. Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN), [S. l.], v. 30, n. 61, p. 9–33, 2023. DOI: 10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n61ID31669. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/31669. Acesso em: 7 jul. 2024.

Issue

Vol. 30 No. 61 (2023): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN)

Section

Artigos

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Copyright (c) 2023 André Luiz Lima Cardoso

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