O que Kant pode nos ensinar sobre tolerância

Abstract

In this essay, I explore how Kant's philosophical principles can offer an approach that is still relevant
today for dealing with intolerant speech. I present the distinction between the public use and the private use of
reason for Kant, aiming to demonstrate that, according to the author, a democratically elected public representative
who defends anti-democratic ideas should resign from his position. Using Popper's paradox of tolerance reasoning, I
show that being intolerant of anti-democratic speeches is a necessary condition for a democracy to exist. However,
using a partially transcendental argument, I show that this cannot apply to an individual who believes in
anti-democratic speech. Still, I show that we can extract important considerations from this, namely: the
undemocratic individual is fighting for his “right” to express only his own point of view, while the genuinely
tolerant/democratic individual defends the possibility of multiple divergent points of view coexisting.