Logical disputes and the a priori [Disputas lógicas e o a priori]

Autores/as

  • Graham Priest Professor at CUNY (City University of New York); Visitor Professor at University of Melbourne.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2016v23n40ID7482

Palabras clave:

Logic, Theory choice, Rationality, A priori, Multiple criteria

Resumen

In this paper, I propose a general model for the rational resolution of disputes about logic, and discuss a number of its features. These include its dispensing with a traditional notion of the a priori in logic, and some objections to which this might give rise.

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Citas

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Publicado

24-06-2016

Cómo citar

PRIEST, G. Logical disputes and the a priori [Disputas lógicas e o a priori]. Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN), [S. l.], v. 23, n. 40, p. 29–57, 2016. DOI: 10.21680/1983-2109.2016v23n40ID7482. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/7482. Acesso em: 21 nov. 2024.

Número

Vol. 23 Núm. 40 (2016): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN)

Sección

Artigos

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